





# EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> - A Practical Framework for Managing AI Risks Across Organisations

International Neural Network Society (INNS), 22 January 2026

MARKUS KREBSZ



INNS 2026 : Enterprise-wide AI Risk Management<sup>©</sup> (EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup>)

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# EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> Overview

- Origin story (UN AI CRA/Declaration)
- Components
- Risk Mitigants & Controls
- AI Black Swans
- Advantages/Benefits
- What's Next?



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# AI vs. Human control [2020]

Products/services with embedded AI systems and/or other digital technologies may display the following characteristics:

- **Autonomy** means that an AI system is **fully capable of modifying its operating domain or its goals without external intervention, control or oversight**. Autonomy is the prerequisite for agency.
- **Agency** is the **capacity of AI systems to act autonomously, make decisions** that achieve specific goals and **interact with its surroundings and environment**. This involves understanding AI systems as entities that can perform actions based on their programming and data inputs, increasingly independently of human control.
- **Physical** and/or **virtual environments** may be impacted by such products/services.
- Such products/services may also use **persuasion** to influence and change human thinking, decisions, behaviours and actions.
- **AI systems should NOT be able to override human control.**



# Initial Quest: Reducing Humanity's tail risk? [2020]

AI Agency

Cost of AI advances & Innovation:

Need to balance carefully to protect freedoms

Status quo:

Worth monitoring & researching

Loss of Human Control

Human oversight & control:

Regulated & Risk managed


AI Autonomy

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# The Evolving Digital Regulation of Goods and AI

**UNGA AI Resolution A/78/L.49,**  
Unanimously adopted on 21 Mar 2024



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
# UN ECE Declaration on Technical Regulation of Products/Services with Embedded AI

- Government agencies & Governments can become signatories
- Aim to promote **cross-border harmonization** of technical regulations
- Provide **examples of product conformity processes** (CRAs) based on the overarching CRA-AI which other economies could also adopt



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# AI Adoption & Enterprise-wide AI Risk Management?



95% of Enterprises

deploy AI already  
(or are seriously  
considering it)


None of them

have a robust AI Risk  
Management framework  
in place!

Source: #RiskEurope 2025 : Enterprise-wide AI Risk Management<sup>©</sup> (EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup>) Keynote, Nov 2025

## Key foundational pillars

# Strategic Layer & Ethics filter (HAiPECR)



## AI Black Swans

# Resilience Layer

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# EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> Strategic Layer



Strategic alignment +  
Necessity assessment



Organisational  
readiness



Data + Technological  
Maturity

## HAiPECR

- ✓ Digital Ethics?  
*Should we do this?*
- ✓ Conduct Risk?  
*AI incentivises Human behaviour*
- ✓ Auditability?  
*Can we explain the Black Box?*



Risk Tolerance +  
Prioritisation



Governance +  
Accountability



Through-the-life-cycle  
Monitoring + Adaptability

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# Overcoming traditional ERM challenges...



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# ...by augmenting with the MIT AI Risk Taxonomy =


## AI Risk Repository



## 74 AI Risk Frameworks



## Database of 1,600+ AI risks



## Website



Watch on  YouTube

## 2 Taxonomies




**Causal Taxonomy :**  
How, when + why?

**Domain Taxonomy :**  
7 domains / 24 subdomains

Source: <https://airisk.mit.edu/> - watch the 2min explainer video here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCi-wJz6VCY>

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# = EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> Operational Layer



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# The AI Risk Mitigations Quadrant (831 controls)

## Governance & Oversight (30% - 248 controls)

- Board committees
- **Risk Management** (15%)
- Safety frameworks
- Impact assessment

## Technical & Security (12% - 101 controls)

- Model security
- Safety engineering
- Alignment
- Content controls

## Operational Process (36% - 295 controls)

- **Testing & auditing** (15%)
- **Data governance** (7%)
- **Monitoring** (6%)
- Incident response

## Transparency & Accountability (21% - 171 controls)

- Documentation
- **Risk disclosure** (5%)
- Incident reporting
- Third-party access

(+ 16 / 1% mitigants not otherwise categorised)

Source: <https://airisk.mit.edu/blog/mapping-ai-risk-mitigations>

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# EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> Resilience Layer

## Defining Characteristics


- Extreme rarity
- Massive impact
- Retrospective predictability



## New dimensions of Unpredictability

- Emergent Behaviours
- Compounding Unknown Unknowns
- Accelerated Cascading Effects

# EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> Benefits



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# WHAT'S NEXT?



- Doing nothing is not an option!
- Reinventing the wheel is unnecessary:
- Key Strategic pillars, existing ERM frameworks, HAiPECR, AI Risks, Mitigants and AI Black Swans!
- Tech Dynamics require an agile & augmentable risk management approach!



## Enterprise-wide AI Risk Management<sup>©</sup>

is needed to survive – and, ultimately, succeed!



# Thank you !



RiskAI

Prof. Markus Krebsz,  
Founding Director &  
**EW-AiRM<sup>©</sup> Creator / Author**

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# Appendix - Framework comparison

Benefit	Traditional ERM	EW-AiRM <sup>®</sup> Framework	Strategic Impact
<b>Taxonomy specificity</b>	Utilizes generic risk categories	Integrates the <b>MIT AI Risk Taxonomy</b>	Ensures "unknown unknowns" of AI are explicitly identified and tracked.
<b>Temporal velocity</b>	Periodic/Static	Continuous/Dynamic	Shifts governance from "rear-view mirror" auditing to "heads-up display" active management.
<b>Integration strategy</b>	Siloed	Enterprise-Wide	Breaks down silos, creating a unified, holistic risk language that connects code to corporate strategy.
<b>Mitigation precision</b>	Generic Controls	Targeted Mitigants	Moves from passive policy-setting to active technical defense and algorithmic correction.
<b>Auditability &amp; metrics</b>	Qualitative/Subjective	Auditable/Quantifiable	Generates the evidence artifacts required by regulators (e.g., EU AI Act) and auditors.
<b>Cultural resilience</b>	Compliance-Driven	Resilience-Driven	Transforms risk from a "Department of No" into an enabler of speed and innovation.
<b>Regulatory agility</b>	Reactive	Proactive/Adaptive	Future-proofs the organization against a volatile and fragmenting global regulatory landscape.
<b>Socio-Technical scope</b>	Techno-Centric	Human-Centric	Protects against "Responsible AI" failures that cause massive reputational damage.
<b>Residual Risk focus</b>	Inherent Risk Bias	Residual Risk Target	Provides the Board with the "true" exposure number after defenses are applied.
<b>Operational tailoring</b>	Rigid/Standardized	Profile-Based/Tailored	Allows the framework to scale from a small fintech startup to a multinational conglomerate.

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# Appendix - Overarching common regulatory arrangement on products with embedded AI (CRA-AI)

## I. Scope

Products and/or services with embedded digital technologies or an AI system

## II. Product and/or service requirements

- Regulatory objectives and the level of risk
- Societal impact
- Digital considerations

## III. Reference to International Standards

- **ISO/IEC 42001** series of standards on AI management systems
- **ISO/IEC 23894:2023** series of standards on AI – Guidance on Risk Management
- **ISO/IEC TR 22100-5** series of standards on the implications of AI machine learning
- **IEC 62443** series of standards on industrial automation and control systems
- **IEEE 7001-2021** series of standards for transparency of autonomous systems
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence (**OECD/LEGAL/0449**)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (**UNESCO**) Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (**SHS/BIO/PI/2021/1**)
- World Health Organization (**WHO**) Ethics and governance of artificial intelligence for health: Guidance on large multi-modal models


## IV. Conformity Assessment

- New regulatory approach
- Two different types of compliance (product/service + AI)
- Risk assessment framework

## V. Market Surveillance

Methods for continuous compliance throughout the product life cycle. Mandatory independent audits. Product recalls and removal from markets, if necessary.

# Appendix - Project Deliverables




Newly designated UNECE WP.6 Key area of work:

'Digital Regulation of Goods and AI' (Dec 2023)

<https://unece.org/trade/wp6/digital-regulation-goods-artificial-intelligence>

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# Appendix - Proposed next steps

## Overarching Common Regulatory Arrangement

- Seek your approval as per the Programme of work 2024. (ECE/CTCS/WP.6/2023/14, paragraph 10e)
- Request your input in the development of product-specific CRAs

## Declaration

- Encourage relevant national agencies and experts to study the Overarching CRA and Declaration
- Request consider adopting the declaration and becoming a signatory
- To formally launch in Summer 2025

## Future possibilities

- Consider developing a UN convention / treaty for certain products/services with embedded AI and/or other digital technologies



# Appendix 1 – Autonomy & Agency in International Standards

Autonomy	Agency
System autonomy / Supervised autonomy	IEEE Std 7001-2021
Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS)	NIST SP 1011-II-1.0, 2007
Systems acting as “automata in process”	IEEE Std 1872-2015
Six levels of autonomy (0-5, for driverless cars)	SAE J3016_201806
Levels of automation	ISO/IEC 42001 & ISO/IEC 23894
Relationship between autonomy, heteronomy and automation (incl. a tabular representation)	ISO/IEC TR 5469 & ISO/IEC 22989
(Degree / Level of) Autonomy	ISO/IEC TR 24028:2020 & OECD/LEGAL/0449
Various references to autonomy	WHO – Guidance on Large Multi-Modal Models

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# Appendix – Last year's project brief (33<sup>rd</sup> Annual session)



73. The Working Party endorsed the document **The regulatory compliance of products with embedded artificial intelligence or other digital technologies** contained in document ECE/CTCS/WP.6/2023/9, which responds to the 2023 Commission (70th) session decision on “digital and green transformation for sustainable development in the ECE region” (E/ECE/1504). Member States encouraged the project team to continue this work with the development of a guidance document for the implementation of the proposed way forward in this document. Member States encouraged the project team to explore this work further and eventually develop a **CRA or declaration** in support of this topic as outlined in the secretariat report contained in document ECE/CTCS/WP.6/2023/INF.2, within the WP.6 mandate.” (Decision 19)

Source:

*Report on the thirty-third session of the Working Party on Regulatory Cooperation and Standardization Policies ECE/CTCS/WP.6/2023/2*  
[https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/ECE\\_CTCs\\_WP.6\\_2023\\_02\\_E.pdf](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/ECE_CTCs_WP.6_2023_02_E.pdf)

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# Appendix – Instrument features comparison

Common regulatory arrangement	Declaration	Convention
<p>UNECE  </p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Based on <i>Recommendation L on an International Model for Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Based on Good Regulatory Practice</i></li><li>Technical in nature; often adopted at the agency level</li><li>Can evolve with the technology / standards</li><li>Financial implications are indirect related to the cost of compliance to the CRA</li></ul>	<p>UNECE  </p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Declaration outlines a universal principle that the signatories engage to implement</li><li>Political in nature – normally not technical, though could integrate some éléments which are technical in nature</li><li>Could be signed by member State or directly by the pertinent entity that would implement</li><li>Declaration demonstrates an intent (but may not be binding)</li><li>Modifications difficult; would require agreement of all signatories</li><li>Financial implications are indirect related to the cost of compliance</li></ul>	<p>UNECE  </p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Written legal agreement between Member States</li><li>Results from negotiations between Member States who wish to advance on the same topic</li><li>Political by nature (will normally not be technical)</li><li>Signed by member States</li><li>It is binding for those who have signed and ratified, after entry into force</li><li>Withdrawal process integrated into articles of the agreement</li><li>Modifications after entry into force defined by the agreement</li><li>Financial implications for compliance and for creation and maintenance of a secretarial body</li></ul>

Source: [https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/LThompson\\_WP6\\_project.pdf](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/LThompson_WP6_project.pdf)


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# Appendix – Existing UNECE CRAs to date

Title / Symbol	Date	ENG	FRA	RUS
ECE/CTCS/WP.6/2024/11 Overarching common regulatory arrangement for the <b>regulatory compliance of products and/or services with embedded artificial intelligence or other digital technologies</b>	2024	<a href="#">PDF</a>	<a href="#">PDF</a>	<a href="#">PDF</a>
ECE/TRADE/391/Rev.1 Common Regulatory Framework for <b>Equipment Used In Environments with an Explosive Atmosphere</b>	2022	<a href="#">HTML</a>		
Common Regulatory Arrangements on <b>Cybersecurity</b>	2019	<a href="#">PDF</a>	<a href="#">PDF</a>	<a href="#">PDF</a>
Common Regulatory Objectives on <b>Earth-moving Machinery</b>	2009	<a href="#">PDF</a>		
Common Regulatory Objectives (Telecom) for <b>ICT Equipment, for Bluetooth Equipment, for GSM Equipment, for IMT-2000 Equipment, for PC Equipment, for PSTN Equipment and for WLAN Equipment</b>	2004	<a href="#">PDF</a>		

Source: [https://unece.org/trade/wp6/regulatory-cooperation#accordion\\_1](https://unece.org/trade/wp6/regulatory-cooperation#accordion_1)



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# Appendix – Existing WP.6 Declarations

Title / Symbol	Date	ENG	FRA	RUS
<p><b>Declaration on Gender-Responsive Standards and Standards Development</b>, notably:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are <b>86 signatories</b> from <b>every region of the world - mostly standards development organizations (SDOs)</b> – national, regional, international as well as some VSS.</li> <li>• The <b>signatories are de-facto members</b> of the Team of Specialists on Gender-Responsive Standards</li> <li>• There is a <b>follow-up to this declaration through the ToS-GRS</b> long after the declaration has been finalized.</li> </ul>	2019	<a href="#">PDF</a>	<a href="#">PDF</a>	<a href="#">PDF</a>


Source: <https://unece.org/trade/wp6/Gender-Resp%20-Stdards-declaration>



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# Appendix - MIT AI Risk Taxonomy



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# Appendix - Discrimination & Toxicity

<b>Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation</b>	Unequal treatment of individuals or groups by AI, often based on race, gender, or other sensitive characteristics, resulting in unfair outcomes and unfair representation of those groups.
<b>Exposure to toxic Content</b>	AI that exposes users to harmful, abusive, unsafe or inappropriate content. May involve providing advice or encouraging action. Examples of toxic content include hate speech, violence, extremism, illegal acts, or child sexual abuse material, as well as content that violates community norms such as profanity, inflammatory political speech, or pornography.
<b>Unequal performance across groups</b>	Accuracy and effectiveness of AI decisions and actions is dependent on group membership, where decisions in AI system design and biased training data lead to unequal outcomes, reduced benefits, increased effort, and alienation of users.

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# Appendix - Privacy & Security

<b>Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking, or correctly inferring sensitive information</b>	AI systems that memorize and leak sensitive personal data or infer private information about individuals without their consent. Unexpected or unauthorized sharing of data and information can compromise user expectation of privacy, assist identity theft, or cause loss of confidential intellectual property
<b>AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks</b>	AI that exposes users to harmful, abusive, unsafe or inappropriate content. May involve providing advice or encouraging action. Examples of toxic content include hate speech, violence, extremism, illegal acts, or child sexual abuse material, as well as content that violates community norms such as profanity, inflammatory political speech, or pornography.

# Appendix - Misinformation

<b>False or misleading information</b>	AI systems that inadvertently generate or spread incorrect or deceptive information, which can lead to inaccurate beliefs in users and undermine their autonomy. Humans that make decisions based on false beliefs can experience physical, emotional, or material harms
<b>Pollution of information ecosystem and loss of consensus reality</b>	Highly personalized AI-generated misinformation that creates "filter bubbles" where individuals only see what matches their existing beliefs, undermining shared reality and weakening social cohesion and political processes

# Appendix - Malicious actors & Misuse

<b>Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale</b>	Using AI systems to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns, malicious surveillance, or targeted and sophisticated automated censorship and propaganda, with the aim of manipulating political processes, public opinion, and behaviours.
<b>Fraud, scams, and targeted manipulation</b>	Using AI systems to gain a personal advantage over others such as through cheating, fraud, scams, blackmail, or targeted manipulation of beliefs or behaviour. Examples include AI-facilitated plagiarism for research or education, impersonating a trusted or fake individual for illegitimate financial benefit, or creating humiliating or sexual imagery.
<b>Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm</b>	Using AI systems to develop cyber weapons (e.g., by coding cheaper, more effective malware), develop new or enhance existing weapons (e.g., Lethal Autonomous Weapons or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives), or use weapons to cause mass harm

# Appendix - Human-computer interaction

<b>Overreliance and unsafe use</b>	Anthropomorphizing, trusting, or relying on AI systems by users, leading to emotional or material dependence and to inappropriate relationships with or expectations of AI systems. Trust can be exploited by malicious actors (e.g., to harvest information or enable manipulation), or result in harm from inappropriate use of AI in critical situations (such as a medical emergency). Over reliance on AI systems can compromise autonomy and weaken social ties
<b>Loss of human agency and autonomy</b>	Delegating by humans of key decisions to AI systems, or AI systems that make decisions that diminish human control and autonomy, potentially leading to humans feeling disempowered, losing the ability to shape a fulfilling life trajectory, or becoming cognitively enfeebled

## Appendix - Socioeconomic & Environmental Harms

(1/2)

<b>Power centralization and unfair distribution of benefits</b>	AI-driven concentration of power and resources within certain entities or groups, especially those with access to or ownership of powerful AI systems, leading to inequitable distribution of benefits and increased societal inequality
<b>Exposure to toxic Content</b>	Social and economic inequalities caused by widespread use of AI, such as by automating jobs, reducing the quality of employment, or producing exploitative dependencies between workers and their employers.
<b>Economic and cultural devaluation of human effort</b>	AI systems capable of creating economic or cultural value, including through reproduction of human innovation or creativity (e.g., art, music, writing, coding, invention), destabilizing economic and social systems that rely on human effort. The ubiquity of AI-generated content may lead to reduced appreciation for human skills, disruption of creative and knowledge-based industries, and homogenization of cultural experiences

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## Appendix - Socioeconomic & Environmental Harms

(2/2)

<b>Competitive dynamics</b>	Competition by AI developers or state-like actors in an AI "race" by rapidly developing, deploying, and applying AI systems to maximize strategic or economic advantage, increasing the risk they release unsafe and error-prone systems..
<b>Governance failure</b>	Inadequate regulatory frameworks and oversight mechanisms that fail to keep pace with AI development, leading to ineffective governance and the inability to manage AI risks appropriately.
<b>Environmental harm</b>	The development and operation of AI systems that cause environmental harm, such as through energy consumption of data centers or the materials and carbon footprints associated with AI hardware.

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## Appendix - AI System safety, failures & Limitations

(1/2)

<b>AI pursuing its own goals in conflict with human goals or values</b>	AI systems that act in conflict with ethical standards or human goals or values, especially the goals of designers or users. These misaligned behaviours may be introduced by humans during design and development, such as through reward hacking and goal misgeneralisation, and may result in AI using dangerous capabilities such as manipulation, deception, or situational awareness to seek power, self-proliferate, or achieve other goals.
<b>AI possessing dangerous capabilities</b>	AI systems that develop, access, or are provided with capabilities that increase their potential to cause mass harm through deception, weapons development and acquisition, persuasion and manipulation, political strategy, cyber-offense, AI development, situational awareness, and self-proliferation. These capabilities may cause mass harm due to malicious human actors, misaligned AI systems, or failure in the AI system
<b>Lack of capability or robustness</b>	AI systems that fail to perform reliably or effectively under varying conditions, exposing them to errors and failures that can have significant consequences, especially in critical applications or areas that require moral reasoning

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## Appendix - AI System safety, failures & Limitations (2/2)

<b>Lack of transparency or interpretability</b>	Challenges in understanding or explaining the decision-making processes of AI systems, which can lead to mistrust, difficulty in enforcing compliance standards or holding relevant actors accountable for harms, and the inability to identify and correct errors
<b>AI welfare and rights</b>	Ethical considerations regarding the treatment of potentially sentient AI entities, including discussions around their potential rights and welfare, particularly as AI systems become more advanced and autonomous.
<b>Multi-agent risks</b>	Risks from multi-agent interactions due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.

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# Appendix – Risk Mitigation Taxonomy

(1/3)

Mitigation Category	Mitigation Subcategory	Subcategory description	Examples
<b>1. Governance &amp; Oversight Controls</b>  <i>Formal organizational structures and policy frameworks that establish human oversight mechanisms and decision protocols to ensure human accountability, ethical conduct, and risk management throughout AI development and deployment.</i>	1.1 Board Structure & Oversight	Governance structures and leadership roles that establish executive accountability for AI safety and risk management.	<i>Dedicated risk committees, safety teams, ethics boards, crisis simulation training, multi-party authorization protocols, deployment veto powers</i>
	1.2 Risk Management	Systematic methods that identify, evaluate, and manage AI risks for comprehensive risk governance across organizations.	<i>Enterprise risk management frameworks, risk registers with capability thresholds, compliance programs, pre-deployment risk assessments, independent risk assessments</i>
	1.3 Conflict of Interest Protections	Governance mechanisms that manage financial interests and organizational structures to ensure leadership can prioritize safety over profit motives in critical situations.	<i>Background checks for key personnel, windfall profit redistribution plans, stake limitation policies, protections against shareholder pressure</i>
	1.4 Whistleblower Reporting & Protection	Policies and systems that enable confidential reporting of safety concerns or ethical violations to prevent retaliation and encourage disclosure of risks.	<i>Anonymous reporting channels, non-retaliation guarantees, limitations on non-disparagement agreements, external whistleblower handling services</i>
	1.5 Safety Decision Frameworks	Protocols and commitments that constrain decision-making about model development, deployment, and capability scaling, and govern safety-capability resource allocation to prevent unsafe AI advancement.	<i>If-then safety protocols, capability ceilings, deployment pause triggers, safety-capability resource ratios</i>
	1.6 Environmental Impact Management	Processes for measuring, reporting, and reducing the environmental footprint of AI systems to ensure sustainability and responsible resource use.	<i>Carbon footprint assessment, emission offset programs, energy efficiency optimization, resource consumption tracking</i>
	1.7 Societal Impact Assessment	Processes that assess AI systems' effects on society, including impacts on employment, power dynamics, political processes, and cultural values.	<i>Fundamental rights impact assessments, expert consultations on risk domains, stakeholder engagement processes, governance gap analyses</i>

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# Appendix – Risk Mitigation Taxonomy

(2/3)

Mitigation Category	Mitigation Subcategory	Subcategory description	Examples
<b>2. Technical &amp; Security Controls</b>  <i>Technical, physical, and engineering safeguards that secure AI systems and constrain model behaviors to ensure security, safety, alignment with human values, and content integrity.</i>	2.1 Model & Infrastructure Security	Technical and physical safeguards that secure AI models, weights, and infrastructure to prevent unauthorized access, theft, tampering, and espionage.	<i>Model weight tracking systems, multifactor authentication protocols, physical access controls, background security checks, compliance with information security standards</i>
	2.2 Model Alignment	Technical methods to ensure AI systems understand and adhere to human values and intentions.	<i>Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), direct preference optimization (DPO), constitutional AI training, value alignment verification systems</i>
	2.3 Model Safety Engineering	Technical methods and safeguards that constrain model behaviors and protect against exploitation and vulnerabilities.	<i>Safety analysis protocols, capability restriction mechanisms, hazardous knowledge unlearning techniques, input/output filtering systems, defense-in-depth implementations, adversarial robustness training, hierarchical auditing, action replacement</i>
	2.4 Content Safety Controls	Technical systems and processes that detect, filter, and label AI-generated content to identify misuse and enable content provenance tracking.	<i>Synthetic media watermarking, content filtering mechanisms, prohibited content detection, metadata tagging protocols, deepfake creation restrictions</i>
<b>3. Operational Process Controls</b>  <i>Processes and management frameworks governing AI system deployment, usage, monitoring, incident handling, and validation, which promote safety, security, and accountability throughout the system lifecycle.</i>	3.1 Testing & Auditing	Systematic internal and external evaluations that assess AI systems, infrastructure, and compliance processes to identify risks, verify safety, and ensure performance meets standards.	<i>Third-party audits, red teaming, penetration testing, dangerous capability evaluations, bug bounty programs</i>
	3.2 Data Governance	Policies and procedures that govern responsible data acquisition, curation, and usage to ensure compliance, quality, user privacy, and removal of harmful content.	<i>Harmful content filtering protocols, compliance checks for data collection standards, user data privacy controls, data curation processes</i>
	3.3 Access Management	Operational policies and verification systems that govern who can use AI systems and for what purposes to prevent safety circumvention, deliberate misuse, and deployment in high-risk contexts.	<i>KYC verification requirements, API-only access controls, fine-tuning restrictions, acceptable use policies, high-stakes application prohibitions</i>
	3.4 Staged Deployment	Implementation protocols that deploy AI systems in stages, requiring safety validation before expanding user access or capabilities.	<i>Limited API access programs, gradual user base expansion, capability threshold assessments, pre-deployment validation checkpoints, treating model updates as new deployments</i>
	3.5 Post-Deployment Monitoring	Ongoing monitoring processes that track AI behavior, user interactions, and societal impacts post-deployment to detect misuse, emergent dangerous capabilities, and harmful effects.	<i>User interaction tracking systems, capability evolution assessments, periodic impact reports, automated misuse detection, usage pattern analysis tools</i>

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# Appendix – Risk Mitigation Taxonomy (3/3)

Mitigation Category	Mitigation Subcategory	Subcategory description	Examples
	3.6 Incident Response & Recovery	Protocols and technical systems that respond to security incidents, safety failures, or capability misuse to contain harm and restore safe operations.	<i>Incident response plans, emergency shutdown/rollback procedures, model containment mechanisms, safety drills, critical infrastructure protection measures</i>
<b>4. Transparency &amp; Accountability Controls</b>  <i>Formal disclosure practices and verification mechanisms that communicate AI system information and enable external scrutiny to build trust, facilitate oversight, and ensure accountability to users, regulators, and the public.</i>	4.1 System Documentation	Comprehensive documentation protocols that record technical specifications, intended uses, capabilities, and limitations of AI systems to enable informed evaluation and governance.	<i>Model cards, system architecture documentation, compute resource disclosures, safety test result reports, system prompts, model specifications</i>
	4.2 Risk Disclosure	Formal reporting protocols and notification systems that communicate risk information, mitigation plans, safety evaluations, and significant AI activities to enable external oversight and inform stakeholders.	<i>Publishing risk assessment summaries, pre-deployment notifications to government, reporting large training runs, disclosing mitigation strategies, notifying affected parties</i>
	4.3 Incident Reporting	Formal processes and protocols that document and share AI safety incidents, security breaches, near-misses, and relevant threat intelligence with appropriate stakeholders to enable coordinated responses and systemic improvements.	<i>Cyber threat intelligence sharing networks, mandatory breach notification procedures, incident database contributions, cross-industry safety reporting mechanisms, standardized near-miss documentation protocols</i>
	4.4 Governance Disclosure	Formal disclosure mechanisms that communicate governance structures, decision frameworks, and safety commitments to enhance transparency and enable external oversight of high-stakes AI decisions.	<i>Published safety and/or alignment strategies, governance documentation, safety cases, model registration protocols, public commitment disclosures</i>
	4.5 Third-Party System Access	Mechanisms granting controlled system access to vetted external parties to enable independent assessment, validation, and safety research of AI models and capabilities.	<i>Researcher access programs, third-party capability assessments, government access provisions, legal safe harbors for public interest evaluations</i>
	4.6 User Rights & Recourse	Frameworks and procedures that enable users to identify and understand AI system interactions, report issues, request explanations, and seek recourse or remediation when affected by AI systems.	<i>User reporting channels, appeal processes, explanation request systems, remediation protocols, content verification</i>

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